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This article analyzes the conception, evolution and recent
development of debt-for-nature exchange techniques. It explores how the
lessons of the early, problematic exchanges have been learned and how the
highly successful exchanges conducted recently in Madagascar, Egypt, and
Kenya have been structured. It assesses the possibility of the Clean
Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol being tapped as a
source of ongoing funding for projects, and concludes by arguing that, given
the various benefits exchanges offer both donors and recipients, these
techniques have been underutilized and deserve more careful consideration.
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I. Introduction
In October 1984, Dr. Thomas Lovejoy, then executive vice president of
the World Wildlife Fund (“WWF”), wrote an opinion piece for The New York
Times that is generally credited with providing the first public formulation of
the debt-for-nature idea.1
Lovejoy proposed that a developing country’s external debt be reduced
in return for it taking steps to address issues of environmental concern, and
that governments provide tax relief to commercial creditor banks for
participating in these transactions.2 Lovejoy emphasized the correlation
between developing country indebtedness and environmental degradation3
and encouraged environmental NGOs to investigate using the developing
country secondary debt market to finance conservation projects. He noted
that discounted developing country debt could potentially leverage
“conservation dollars to preserve some of the world’s most biologically
valuable natural areas while helping countries reduce their external debt.”4
This type of debt-exchange transaction is based on the simple notion
of a reduction in external debt in return for domestic conservation
activities.5 In the 1980s, most developing country foreign debt was
denominated in U.S. dollars (or other hard currencies). Many developing
nations employed short-term, often indiscriminate strategies to produce
exports to generate foreign exchange for debt repayment. One of the most
destructive activities undertaken in this regard was the clearing of
rainforests.6 Tropical rainforests are primarily in developing countries, with

1.
Thomas E. Lovejoy III, Aid Debtor Nations’ Ecology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984,
at A31; J. Eugene Gibson & Randall K. Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 331, 333 n.9 (1990).
2.
Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & James C. Nicholas, Debt for Nature Swaps: A
Modest but Meaningful Response to Two International Crises, 5 FLA. J. INT’L L. 193, 198 (1990);
Timothy B. Hamlin, Debt-for-Nature Swaps A New Strategy for Protecting Environmental
Interests in Developing Nations, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1065, 1067 (1989).
3.
Nancy Knupfer, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Innovation or Intrusion?, 4(2) N.Y. INT’L
L. REV. 86, 87 (1991).
4.
Press Release, WWF, World Wildlife Fund and Ecuador Sign Large Debtfor-Nature Swap (Dec. 14, 1987) at 2, in Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, Debt-for-Nature Swaps:
Extending the frontiers of Innovative Financing in Support of the Global Environment, 25 THE INT’L
LAW. 557, 564 (1991).
5.
Konrad von Moltke, Debt-for-Nature: The Second Generation, 14 HASTINGS INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 973, 975 (1991); Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 4, at 581.
6.
Michael S. Sher, Can Lawyers Save the Rainforest? Enforcing the Second
Generation of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 17 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 151, 158 (1993).
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twenty-five percent of such forests in Latin America alone.7 In the late
1980s, approximately 140,000 acres of tropical rain forest were being cleared
in Latin America every day,8 prompting predictions that by 2000, “tropical
forests will have been largely destroyed.”9 As well as clearing forests to
convert land to pasture or agriculture, significant amounts of timber were
harvested,10 much of it illegally.11
The use of debt-for-nature swaps has evolved since the early
exchanges, and they are now used to address a broad range of
environmental challenges. Two broad forms of debt-for-nature exchanges
have developed. In the first form, a nation’s debts are purchased by an
environmental NGO and offered to the debtor for cancellation in exchange
principally for its ongoing protection of a designated parcel of its land. In
the second form, the debt is exchanged, usually at a discount, for local
currency which is then used by local conservation groups or government
agencies for various environmental projects in the debtor country.
The so-called ”first generation” exchanges involve the purchase on the
secondary market of commercial bank debt by non-governmental
organizations. “Second generation” mechanisms are bilateral agreements
between donor and recipient governments and use official debt (loans by
one nation to another). Second generation transactions have used larger
amounts of debt for a broader range of environmental and developmental
purposes, the impetus for which was provided by the enactment of a range
of legislative provisions in the United States.12 The most recent debt-fornature exchanges have evolved even further, as we shall see, to address a
broader array of environmental issues and to place the debtor nation at the
center of each exchange.

7.
Andrew Wolman, Review of Conservation Payment Initiatives in Latin America:
Conservation Concessions, Conservation Incentive Agreements and Permit Retirement Schemes, 28
WM. & MARY ENVTL L. & POL’Y REV. 859, 860 (2004).
8.
Nina M. Dillon, The Feasibility of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 16 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 127, 127 (1991).
9.
Ecologists Make Friends with Economists, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 15, 1988, at 25.
10.
Robert J. Buschbacher, Ecological Analysis of Natural Forest Management in the
Humid Tropics, in RACE TO SAVE THE TROPICS: ECOLOGY & ECONOMICS FOR A SUSTAINABLE
FUTURE 59 (Robert Goodland ed., 1990).
11.
Despite the United Nations’ international efforts and some domestic
measures, illegal logging continues to increase in countries such as Cambodia, Laos,
Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Solomon Islands and Thailand. See
Jennifer Lynn Peters, The Illegal Trafficking of Timber in Cambodia, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 102, 104 (2000).
12.
Ross P. Buckley & Steven Freeland, US Debt for Development Legislation: A
Missed Opportunity to Enhance United States' National Security (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript on file with the authors).
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II. ‘First Generation’ Debt Exchanges
Early debt-for-nature exchanges involved the cooperation and
agreement of environmental NGOs, the developing country’s government,
and its central bank. These are often referred to as “first generation” debt
exchanges. The very first was in 1987 in Bolivia.

A. Bolivia (1987) - ‘Debt-for-Conservation’
In 1987, Conservation International (“CI”), a Washington-based
environmental NGO, bought US$650,000 of Bolivia’s debt in the
international secondary debt market for about US$100,000. Funding came
from a grant given by a private charitable foundation.13 Under the debt
exchange agreement,14 this debt was swapped for shares in a newly
established company set up to preserve approximately 3.7 million acres of
forests and grasslands surrounding the Beni Biosphere Reserve in
northeastern Bolivia,15 an area noted for its biological richness.16 CI agreed
to provide ongoing assistance to Bolivia as “official advisor” to plan and
design the protected areas.17 For its part, Bolivia undertook to provide legal
protection for the 334,200-acre reserve, and to establish a local currency
fund equivalent to US$250,000 to manage and administer the protected
areas.18 Bolivia was to contribute US$100,000 of this sum, with the
remainder to come from the United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”).19 Bolivia and a local NGO shared the management
of the land, and title to it remained with Bolivia.20
This first debt-for-nature transaction highlighted a range of potential
13.
The Frank Weeden Foundation based in San Francisco.
14.
Agreement between the Government of Bolivia and Conservation
International, 13 July 1987.
15.
Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 4, at 565.
16.
The reserve supports 6,000-8,000 species of vascular plants, including at
least 500 bird species and 13 endangered animal species. See Gibson & Curtis, supra
note 1, at 354.
17.
Press Release, Conservation International, Bolivia Sets Precedent with
First Ever ‘Debt-for-Nature’ Swap (July 16, 1987) at 1, in Priya Alagiri, Give Us
Sovereignty or Give Us Debt: Debtor Countries’ Perspective on Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 41 AM. U.
L. REV. 485, 495 n.58 (1992).
18.
Marilyn Post, The Debt-for-Nature Swap: A Long-Term Investment for the Economic
Stability of Less Developed Countries, 24 INT’L LAW. 1071, 1082 (1990); Robert M. Sadler,
Debt-for-Nature Swaps: Assessing the Future, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 319, 326
(1990).
19.
J. Eugene Gibson & William J. Schrenk, The Enterprise for the Americas
Initiative: A Second Generation of Debt-for-Nature Exchanges - with an Overview of Other
Recent Exchange Initiatives, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 17 (1991); Gibson &
Curtis, supra note 1, at 356.
20.
Post, supra note 18, at 1082.
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problems with the debt exchange mechanism. The primary problems that
emerged concerned national sovereignty, the position of indigenous
peoples, and the enforceability of the agreement.
When the proposed transaction with Bolivia was announced, various
Latin American newspapers reported (incorrectly) that a foreign organization
had purchased Bolivian “lands considered the national patrimony.”21 Several
Latin American countries criticized the idea of debt exchanges,22 and even
though the local organization involved was able to explain the true position,
this lingering mistrust associated with the transaction highlighted some of
the potential sensitivities associated with debt exchanges.
The local indigenous people were not adequately consulted during the
design phase of the project. The Chimane lived in the forest without formal
land tenure,23 but with the advent of the debt exchange, they sought to
obtain title to the land. However, the terms of this debt exchange made this
impossible.24 Already threatened with the destruction of their natural
habitat through indiscriminate and illegal logging, they were now presented
with an “American-type” national park model,25 in which their ability to
engage in traditional foraging for food and fuel was further restricted. In
effect, the debt exchange agreement divested the Chimane of their land
rights,26 as many of their traditional activities conflicted with the
conservation goals that underpinned the transaction.27 The lack of timely
local input represented a major failing of this transaction.
To further complicate matters, Bolivia failed to contribute its
equivalent of US$100,000 to the local currency account until almost two
years after the agreement was signed.28 As a result, the USAID funding that
was contingent upon Bolivia’s contribution was not forthcoming and the

21.
Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 356.
22.
Brazil was initially one of the most vehement critics of the debt-for-nature
mechanism. See Antonio N. Picirillo, The Metamorphosis: Expected Changes in the Brazilian
Debt-for-Nature Swap Process and Policy Implications, 17 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 547, 563-64
(1994). In 1989, Brazil’s President Jose Sarney ruled out debt-for-nature swaps citing
national sovereignty, and declared, “We accept international aid, but we don’t accept
conditions.” See James Brooke, Brazil Announces Plan to Protect the Amazon, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 1989.
23.
Eve Burton, Debt for Development: A New Opportunity for Nonprofits, Commercial
Banks, and Developing States, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 233, 242 n.63 (1990).
24.
Amanda Lewis, The Evolving Process of Swapping Debt for Nature, 10 COLO. J.
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 431, 436 (1999).
25.
Knupfer, supra note 3, at 89.
26.
E. Webb, Debt for Nature Swaps: The Past, the Present and some Possibilities for the
Future, 11 ENVTL & PLANNING L. J. 222, 227 (1994).
27.
Lewis, supra note 24, at 437.
28.
Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 357.
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project was significantly under-funded.29 Furthermore, Bolivia initially failed
to enact national legislation designed to legally protect the Reserve.30 This
issue was made even more complex by the fact that the Beni region was one
of Bolivia’s principal areas for illegal cocaine processing.31 Bolivia did not
fully comply with its responsibilities, and the debt-for-nature agreement did
not contain mechanisms that were enforceable.32
Despite the problems associated with the Bolivian transaction, several
positive outcomes ensued from this pioneering arrangement. It confirmed
that exchanging developing country debt, even where the amounts involved
were relatively small, to advance conservation, environmental (and perhaps
developmental) goals, was feasible, as long as due account was taken of
relevant local conditions. Clearly, this last caveat is crucial, since each debt
exchange needs to accommodate the recipient region’s specific
circumstances.
In addition, the exchange led to a positive spin-off - after Bolivia
implemented the debt-for-nature exchange, the International Tropical
Timber Organization (“ITTO”)33 provided it with a US$1.26 million grant for
continued forestry conservation.34

B. Further ‘First Generation’ Debt-for-Nature Swaps
Early debt-for-nature transactions in Ecuador and Costa Rica were
structured to address some of the concerns that arose in the Bolivian swap.
In 1987, a second debt-for-nature exchange was undertaken, with the
WWF, The Nature Conservancy, and the Missouri Botanical Gardens

29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
For more detailed discussion on the non-enforceable character of many of
the early debt exchange transactions, see Tamara J. Hrynik, Debt-for-Nature Swaps:
Effective but not Enforceable, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 141 (1990). The issue of
enforceability is of greater significance when developed country “public funds,” such
as United States taxpayers’ dollars, are involved. See Rosanne Model, Debt-for-Nature
Swaps: Environmental Investments Using Taxpayer Funds Without Adequate Remedies for
Expropriation, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1195, 1203 (1991).
33.
The ITTO is an international organization that “encourages the
development of forestry alternatives that can be replicated in other countries.” SEE
CONSERVATION INTERNATIONAL FOUNDATION, THE DEBT-FOR-NATURE EXCHANGE: A TOOL FOR
INTERNATIONAL CONSERVATION, 14 n.4 (1991).
34.
Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 19, at 9. However, this forest management
plan was difficult to implement, due to conflicts of interest between various groups
and the lack of interest in reforestation demonstrated by the timber companies. See
id. at 9 n.32.
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purchasing US$10 million of Ecuador’s external debt for US$1.5 million.35
The funds were then assigned to a private Ecuadorian conservation group,
Fundacion Natura (“FN”).36 Upon conversion, the debt was exchanged at full
face value into local currency bonds in FN’s favor.37 The principal amount
funded FN’s establishment38 and an endowment fund to support its general
activities.39 FN uses the interest generated by the bonds to undertake a
diverse range of environmental projects to protect Ecuadorian national
parks and reserves.40
In contrast to the Bolivian transaction, in Ecuador the agreed
conservation activities were undertaken by the local NGO without
government participation. From an environmental funding viewpoint, the
transaction was a success. Like many developing countries, Ecuador had
found it difficult to devote significant financial resources to the
environment.41 Even though the US$10 million of debt represented only a
fraction of Ecuador’s total external debt, the resulting environmental
funding was very significant in the circumstances. Interest payments in the
first year alone doubled Ecuador’s entire budget for national parks.42
Through the use of an endowment fund, within Ecuador any
perception of a loss of sovereignty was far less, as the range of projects was
selected with local input as opposed to the entire transaction being for the
preservation of one area of a country designated important by a foreign
conservation group.
In 1987, the Costa Rican “Debt-for-Conservation” agreement followed a
structure similar to that utilized in the Ecuadorian swap.43 Within three
years, in excess of US$70 million of Costa Rica’s external debt was swapped
into local currency bonds (equivalent to US$36 million) through the

35.
Catherine A. O’Neill & Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and the Environment:
Trading Debt and Technology for Nature, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 93, 108 (1992).
36.
Lewis, supra note 24, at 437.
37.
The local currency of Ecuador at the time was the sucre. However, in
1999, Ecuador changed its local currency into U.S. dollars as part of an extensive
restructuring of its financial system. See Larry Rohter, As U.S. Military Settles In, Some
in Ecuador Have Doubts, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000. See also Divided About the Dollar, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 2001, at 36.
38.
Lewis, supra note 24, at 437.
39.
Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 361.
40.
Allegra G. Biggs, Nibbling Away at the Debt Crisis Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 10
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 429, 456 (1991).
41.
Ronny J. Halperin, Revenue Ruling 87-124:Treasuries’ Flawed Interpretation of
Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 721 (1989).
42.
Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 360.
43.
Lewis, supra note 24, at 437.
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implementation of four debt exchanges.44
Under debt exchange agreements in 1987 and 1998,45 US$5.4 million of
Costa Rica’s debt was purchased in the international secondary market for
US$918,000, funded by the WWF and donations to the Costa Rican National
Parks Foundation from a variety of other NGOs.46 The debt was converted at
seventy-five percent of face value into medium-term local currency bonds,47
with an average annual interest rate of 25%.48 Interest income was used to
establish a fund for conservation projects, including the Guanacaste
National Park project, with title to land purchased reverting to the
government only after the park was fully completed and endowed.49

III. ‘Second Generation’ Debt-for-Nature Exchanges
The success of some “first generation” transactions, coupled with the
growing international awareness of the relationship between the
environment and development, opened the way for a new form of debt
exchange involving official debt rather than commercial bank debt.50 These
transactions were on a bilateral government-to-government basis, with the
developed country donor governments playing a central role. This form of
debt exchange reflected a convergence of interests between the respective
governments.51
The advent of government-to-government agreements was an
important development in the evolution of the debt exchange mechanism,
because it allowed for the exchange of larger amounts of debt. This was
facilitated in part by the introduction of a debt swap clause by the Paris Club
in 1991, through which bilateral debt was deemed as eligible to be
exchanged and debt exchange programs for the conversion of Official

44.
Two of these transactions were “second generation” debt exchange
transactions.
45.
Costa Rican Debt-for-Nature Agreement, Oct. 27, 1987, between the Costa
Rican Central Bank, the Ministry of Natural Resources, Energy and Mines, the Costa
Rican Cooperative Bank RL, and Fundacion de Parques Nacionales (The Costa Rican
National Parks Foundation, a Costa Rican NGO): Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 366
n.172.
46.
These included the Nature Conservancy, Asociacion Ecologica La Pacifica,
Pew Charitable Fund, MacArthur Foundation, J.S. Noyes Foundation, Swedish Society
for the Conservation of Nature, W. Alton Jones Foundation, and Organization for
Tropical Studies and Conservation International. See id. at 369 n.187.
47.
These bonds were structured to mature after five years and nine months.
See Gibson & Curtis, supra note 1, at 367.
Id.
48.
49.
Alagiri, supra note 17, at 496.
50.
Lewis, supra note 24, at 439.
51.
von Moltke, supra note 5, at 983.
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Development Assistance were approved.52
The expansion of debt exchanges to include official debt pushed the
concerns of enforceability, political viability, and transparency to the core.
Governments needed to consider the potential for political fallout from a
failure to satisfactorily implement an agreement.53 These government-togovernment transactions became known as “second generation”54 debt
exchanges.

A. Costa Rica (1989) - ‘Debt-for-Conservation’ and ‘Debtfor-Industry’
Costa Rica, with twelve percent of its land designated as national parks
or protected biological reserves, represented a prime candidate for debt-fornature swaps and benefited from early exchanges.55 In the late 1980s, Costa
Rica participated in six debt-for-nature agreements, which retired 6.5% of its
national debt.56 In January 1989, the Netherlands and Costa Rica agreed that
the former would purchase US$33 million of Costa Rican debt in the
secondary debt market, to be converted into local currency four-year bonds,
equivalent in value to US$9.9 million.57 Interest was to be calculated at the
annual rate of 15%, and these bonds were held in a trust fund, administered
by both governments, in order to fund projects in reforestation and forest
management.58
This was the first government-to-government debt-for-nature
exchange, and was innovative for the inclusion within the agreement of
enforcement measures. These measures enabled each government to retain
control over the projects financed, both through the requirement that both
countries sign every project agreed to and by virtue of their ongoing ability
to inspect projects and, if appropriate, to suspend finance for noncomplying projects.59 The agreement, however, did not go so far as to

52.
Melissa Moye, Overview of Debt Conversion, 10 (Debt Relief International Ltd.,
2001).
53.
Sadler, supra note 18, at 335.
54.
For example, see von Moltke, supra note 5, and Sher, supra note 6.
55.
Brijesh Thapa, The Relationship Between Debt-for-Nature Swaps and Protected Area
Tourism: A Plausible Strategy for Developing Countries, 15(2) USDA Forest Service
Proceedings 268, 269 (2000).
56.
Sean Michael Neal, Bringing Developing Nations on Board the Climate Change
Protocol: Using Debt-for-Nature Swaps to Implement the Clean Development Mechanism, 11 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL L. REV. 163, 172 (1998).
57.
Agreement on Financial Cooperation in order to Support Forest
Development, January 1989, in Sher, supra note 6, at 170.
58.
Karel van Kesteren, The Use of Aid Money for Debt Reduction: A View from Inside,
6 J. INT’L DEV. 241, 243 (1994).
59.
Lewis, supra note 24, at 442.
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include a dispute resolution mechanism.60
Another oversight of the agreement was the failure to provide for any
role for NGOs in the selection of projects or with respect to governance.61
While the value of the debt exchanged was not large, through the creation of
a trust fund, interest continued to accrue, which provided an ongoing source
of conservation finance. The interest generated was in itself greater than the
total annual Costa Rican park service budget.62
In the same year, Sweden purchased about US$28 million of Costa
Rica’s external debt for US$3.5 million and donated it to Costa Rica’s
National Parks Foundation. Upon conversion, four-year bonds were created
paying annual interest at a rate of 15%, which went into an endowment for
research, environmental education, park management, and land
acquisition.63 The primary focus was to fund sustainable management of
tropical forests in the Guanacaste province.64

B. Poland (1991) - ‘Debt-for-Democracy’
The early 1990s saw the debt exchange mechanism developed further
to apply to much larger amounts of a developing country’s external debt. In
March 1991, seven major industrialized countries agreed to forgive half of
Poland’s US$33-billion debt.65 In addition some Paris Club countries agreed
to channel interest payments and principal on some of the remaining debt
into a Polish EcoFund to finance projects aimed at halting environmental
damage. The Paris Club rescheduling had authorized members to sell their
debt for exchanges involving local currency funding. In total, US$473 million
in local currency was invested in the EcoFund; the United States was the
largest single donor, contributing US$367 million for EcoFund projects.66
These actions were intended to show support for the democratic and
economic reforms instituted in Poland following the introduction of a postCommunist government.67 Poland was suffering from severe economic

60.
Sher, supra note 6, at 171.
61.
Id. at 171-72.
62.
Thapa, supra note 55, at 269.
63.
The Guanacaste National Park Project Endowment: Gibson & Curtis, supra
note 1, at 370.
64.
Neal, supra note 56, at 172.
65.
The Paris Club consists of the major creditors of a country seeking a
rescheduling of its debt. It is named after its usual meeting place, and was first
“formed” in 1956. It has no fixed membership, officers or permanent administrative
staff. See Ross P. Buckley, Rescheduling as the Groundwork for Secondary Markets in Sovereign
Debt, 26:2 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 299, 300 n.9 (1998); and Lewis, supra note 24, at 443.
66.
Pervaze A. Sheikh, Debt-for-Nature Initiatives and the Tropical Forest Conservation
Act: Status and Implementation, CRS Report for Congress RL31286, CRS-5 (Oct. 11, 2006).
67.
Gibson & Schrenk, supra note 19, at 66.
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stagnation which, coupled with its unsustainable debt burden, had pushed
it to the brink of insolvency.68 Furthermore, Poland was highly polluted.69 To
reduce the “transboundary” effects of its pollution on neighboring countries,
the Paris Club Agreement was made conditional upon the implementation
of environmental cleanup programs and anti-pollution measures in Poland.
The EcoFund provides grants to approved conservation projects.
Projects approved have been in the areas of transboundary air pollution,
climate change, biological diversity and a cleanup of the Baltic Sea.70
Between 1992 and 2007, the EcoFund financed 1,500 programs. The
financing agreements typically provided for annual payments until 2010.71
The successful near-completion of this program demonstrates the
adaptability of the exchange mechanism and its ability to be applied to
significant amounts of debt in order to facilitate social and economic
development. The Polish debt-for-democracy exchange is the largest debtfor-nature exchange to date.72

C. Bulgaria
Following the example of Poland, Bulgaria was the second Eastern
European country to participate in a debt-for-nature exchange. In 1995,
Switzerland and Bulgaria signed a debt-for-nature exchange of 20 million
Swiss francs, with the stipulation that the equivalent amount in local
currency would be invested in environmental protection and clean up in
Bulgaria.73 The swap amounted to twenty-three percent of Bulgaria’s
external debt owed to Switzerland, and the National Trust EcoFund (“NTEF”)
was established to administer the funds.74 The NTEF has four priority areas:
cleanup of past pollution, reduction of air pollution, clean water protection,
and preservation of biodiversity.75 The fund’s objective is “the management

68.
D. H. Cole, Cleaning Up Krakow: Poland’s Ecological Crisis and the Political
Economy of International Environmental Assistance, 2 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 205, 217
(1991).
69.
At the time Poland had the fourth largest external debt in the world: Id. at 217.
70.
Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. (OECD), Lessons Learnt from
Experience with Debt-for-Environment Swaps in Economies in Transition, 5 (2007),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/28/39352290.pdf (hereinafter OECD (2007)).
71.
Environmental Technologies Action Plan, Polish EcoFund Offers
Template for Eco-Innovation Funding, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/etap/
inaction/functions/New_Services/225_en.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
72.
OECD (2007), supra note 70, at 26.
73.
Thapa, supra note 55, 271-2.
74.
OECD, Debt-for-Environment Swap in Georgia: Pre-feasibility Study and
Institutional Options 44 (2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/56/35178696.pdf
(hereinafter OECD (2006)).
75.
National Trust Eco Fund, http://www.ecofund-bg.org/NDEF/index.php?
pageid=1&lng=en (last visited Aug. 1, 2009).
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of means provided under debt-for-environment and debt-for-nature swap
agreements” and other environmental financing.76
The NTEF only plays a co-financing role in environmental projects.77
By 2006, seventy-two projects had been financed by the NTEF.78 Projects
included hazardous waste and substances disposal, funding of waste
treatment plants, and the management and development of infrastructure in
protected areas.79 While the NTEF was established with the revenue
generated by the debt swap, it has since expanded its financing base. In a
2003 assessment, its strength was attributed to its role in securing cofinancing from other international sources, using the publicity created by
the debt-for-nature swap as a platform to seek further contributions.80 The
political independence and stable revenue provided by the debt swap were
found to be important factors in the NTEF’s success.81
The Polish and Bulgarian debt-for-nature swaps provide good
examples of a structure to allow for the transparent administration of a
debt-for-nature swap using an environmental fund. The OECD notes that
the Bulgarian EcoFund has proven to be a model of good governance
“known for its rigorous project selection procedures and transparent
decision-making.”82
Moreover, creating an environment fund establishes a long-term
financing mechanism.83 The strength of such funds lies in their organized
and enduring structure and their independence from government.84 The
creation of environmental funds has provided stability and direction to
conservation policies in developing countries.85
The Peruvian Trust Fund for National Parks and Protected Areas
(“PROFONANPE”) is a similar environmental fund, which finances
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biodiversity, conservation, and sustainable development programs.86 It was
established by a contribution of US$5.2 million from the Global
Environmental Facility as an endowment fund. Since then it has been
funded principally through debt-for-nature swaps and now has a capital of
US$95.9 million.87 Debt-for-nature swaps have thus far been undertaken
with Germany, Canada, Finland, and the United States.88

D. United States Legislative Initiatives
The United States has played a pioneering role in debt-for-nature
exchanges, as it was the first nation to implement legislative initiatives to
facilitate such environmental financing. In 1989, the U.S. Congress passed
the Global Environmental Protection Assistance Act (“GEPA”),89 which
established funding and support for additional USAID debt exchange
activities.90 The GEPA did not authorize the United States to participate in
bilateral debt reduction (second generation exchanges), but instead
authorized USAID to grant funds to environmental NGOs to purchase
secondary market debt to be utilized in first generation debt-fordevelopment exchanges.91 To minimize sovereignty concerns, the legislation
prohibits the United States government from taking title to, or an interest in,
land within a recipient country as a condition of the transaction.92 By 1998,
USAID had provided US$95 million to environmental NGOs for the
acquisition of US$146 million of external developing country debt, which
was subsequently used in debt exchange transactions.93
The 1990 Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Act (“EAI”) authorized
the exchange of bilateral debt for environmental protection. Under the EAI,
the United States agreed to reduce debt owed by eligible countries once
they entered into an Environmental Framework Agreement (“EFA”) with the
United States, which provides for the establishment of an Environmental
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Trust Fund.94 Principal payments on the reduced debt are then paid in U.S.
dollars, and interest is to be paid in local currency into a local environment
fund at concessionary rates.95 The EAI introduced stringent eligibility
preconditions for debtor nations to participate in such agreements,
including requirements of a democratic government, respect for human
rights, and economic reform programs.96
By 1993, the United States had signed EFAs with Chile, El Salvador,
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica, Peru, and Uruguay, resulting in
US$875 million of debt being converted into the local currency equivalent of
US$154 million of environmental protection funding.97 The program allowed
for the funding of a wide range of activities, including conservation,
education, agriculture, and sustainable development projects.98
The next legislative initiative by the United States to promote debt-fornature exchanges was the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 (“TFCA”).
It is modeled on the EAI, but is not restricted to Latin American and
Caribbean countries, and extends to any nation with a tropical forest of
global or regional significance. The TFCA provides for “grant” funds whereby
funds invested in Tropical Forest Funds, overseen by NGOs and community
groups, are distributed through grants to implement chosen conservation
projects.99
The TFCA provides for three types of debt exchanges: debt reductions,
debt buybacks, and debt swaps. Under the TFCA, the United States can
establish partnerships with NGOs that are able to provide additional
funding for debt reductions.100 As of 2007, a range of NGOs, primarily the
Nature Conservancy (“TNC”), CI, and the WWF, had contributed more than
US$9.6 million to transactions implemented under the TFCA.101 To date,
fourteen TFCA agreements have been conducted in twelve countries, which
will generate more than US$188 million for tropical forest conservation.102
With the implementation of a second agreement with Peru, announced in
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late 2008, Peru will become the largest beneficiary, with more than US$35
million generated for conservation activities.103 Under TFCA agreements, an
estimated 136 million acres of tropical forests have been preserved.104 The
success of the legislation has led to expressions of interest from Brazil, Peru,
and Kenya to participate in the initiative.105

IV. Recent Debt-for-Nature Exchanges
The range of extensive multilateral debt relief initiatives since 2000 has
led to the continued utility of debt-for-nature exchanges being challenged.
One commentator asked, “has the multilateral HIPC ended the era of
bilateral debt-for-nature swaps?”106 Support for, and the use of, debt-fornature exchanges have, however, continued to grow, particularly as a tool for
conservation finance in highly indebted nations that have failed to qualify
for the HIPC initiative or the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (“MDRI”).
Indeed, several international organizations and NGOs have continued to
advocate for greater use of debt-for-nature exchanges in a wide range of
countries across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere.107
The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and
the Caribbean (“U.N. ECLAC”) in 2001 considered the debt
exchange mechanism as “underutilized” for conservation
purposes, and advocated the potential of debt exchanges to help
limit deforestation, preserve other resources such as water and
biodiversity, and promote clean energy.108 The OECD has
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endorsed the use of debt-for-nature exchanges as a conservation
financing mechanism, stating that [a] debt-for-environment swap
is among the very few mechanisms that can provide sustainable
support for local economic development and at the same time
mobilize domestic spending to protect purely public and
common goods (such as biodiversity) or pure externalities (such
as transboundary or global pollution) in low-income countries.109
The successes of the debt-for-nature programs in Poland, Bulgaria, and
elsewhere have encouraged the OECD to seek to implement such
mechanisms in other nations.
The OECD has argued for the use of debt-for-nature exchanges in
Eastern Europe, and in the Caucasus and Central Asia, given that of all the
nations in these regions, only the Kyrgyz Republic is eligible for debt relief
under multilateral initiatives.110 The OECD has emphasized the importance
of “[a] thorough and rigorous analysis of the debt portfolio” before engaging
in debt-for-nature exchanges.111 In international rescheduling agreements,
both the Kyrgyz Republic and Georgia have included debt-exchange
provisions in the rescheduling of their Paris Club debt, and both
governments have established inter-ministerial working groups on debt-forenvironment exchanges.112
The OECD argues that the best results are achieved through Paris Club
negotiations, and has conducted feasibility studies of the Kyrgyz Republic
and Georgia in order to examine the possibility and potential of such debt
exchanges.113 Despite the high hopes of the Kyrgyz government, the
feasibility study revealed limited potential. Most of its foreign debt is
multilateral,114 and of the small proportion of bilateral debt, the only
creditors to have engaged in exchanges are Germany and France (the other
main creditors were Russia and Turkey, which have not undertaken any debt
exchanges or thus far demonstrated a willingness to do so). Priority projects
that have been identified include biogas production from animal waste and
the prevention of irreversible loss of biodiversity. Germany was identified as
109.
OECD (2007), supra note 70, at 21.
110.
Id. at 13. In 2002, the CIS 7 initiative was launched as a collaborative
effort to facilitate economic growth and poverty reduction for the Kyrgyz Republic,
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has not resulted in debt forgiveness. See Int’l Monetary Fund (IMF) & World Bank, A
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111.
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http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_34335_
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the most likely creditor with which to pursue a debt-for-nature exchange,
and the Kyrgyz government is currently attempting to secure such an
agreement.115
Georgia has sought to utilize the debt-exchange mechanism since
2000, when it asked the World Bank for assistance in negotiating debt-forenvironment schemes with creditor governments.
It sought similar
assistance from the OECD in 2001.116
Following the feasibility study of debt-for-environment exchanges for
Georgia, the OECD recommended that “Georgia pursue a comprehensive
debt-for-environment swap scheme to take advantage of the synergies that
exist between environmental and development objectives.”117
In its
assessment, the OECD noted a number of promising project sectors,
including reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, reducing pollution of
international waters, protecting biological diversity, and facilitating access
for the poor to safe water and sanitation services.118
The report did, however, note that “[p]reparation for the transactions
and financial transfers of a debt-for-environment swap scheme is not going
to be short, easy and cheap.”119 This has proven to be correct, as Georgia is
yet to finalize an agreement for a debt-for-nature exchange with any creditor
nation.120
In terms of potential negative impacts of debt-for-nature transactions,
the OECD has highlighted the threats of inflationary impact, credit-rating
downgrades, and inefficient public administration,121 but at the same time
has noted that the potential benefits of such exchanges are far greater.122
The United Nations Environmental Program (“UNEP”) is also of the view that
debt-for-nature transactions are potentially highly useful.
Alain Lambert has argued there is a dire need to expand innovative
funding mechanisms for environmental projects as “[t]he traditional ‘project
approach’ does not work anymore.”123 The innovative funding mechanisms
he suggests could more broadly tackle environmental concerns in Africa and
include environmental trust funds, payment schemes for environmental
services, debt-for-nature exchanges, and carbon-offset programs. He
considered that “Debt-for-Sustainable Development swaps will never be the
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single definitive solution to the problem but its much more extensive use
could certainly be part of a more global solution.”124
Lambert provided three reasons for the failure of traditional project
funding for environmental conservation. These were: 1.The failure to
provide long-term financing, with conservation activities largely ceasing at
the conclusion of a project; 2. Too great a dependency on donor funding;
and 3. The continuing tendency to view the environment and development
as separate issues.125
The use of debt-for-nature exchanges in the past decade highlights
their ability to address the shortfalls in other conservation mechanisms and
foster long-term financing and an integrated approach to the environment.
Examples of this are set out below.

A. The Madagascar Foundation
Recent debt-for-nature exchanges undertaken by Madagascar
demonstrate the success of trust funds as a means to secure long-term
financing for environmental projects. In 2000, Madagascar was declared
eligible for debt relief under the HIPC initiative. In the preparation of its
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the environment was “considered to be a
crosscutting theme in poverty reduction strategies.”126 In the same year, the
Malagasy government established the Sustainable Financing Commission to
design a sustainable financing strategy for Madagascar’s third
Environmental Program.127 Environmental priorities included environmental
impact evaluations for all projects, sustainable management of coastal and
marine ecosystems, and sustainable financing for protected areas.128
In 2003, Germany undertook a debt-for-nature swap with Madagascar
in relation to debt that was excluded from HIPC treatment.129 Germany
agreed to cancel €23.3 million of debt in exchange for the Malagasy
government paying €13.8 million into a counterpart fund to be disbursed to
finance environmental projects over twenty years.130 The agreement was
contingent on the establishment of a Madagascar Foundation for Protected
Areas and Biodiversity, with a management structure acceptable to the
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German government.131 The Madagascar Foundation was established in
2005. The debt-for-nature exchange reflected the priorities established in
Madagascar’s third Environmental Program.132
The Madagascar Foundation has continued to be funded through debtfor-nature exchanges. Most recently, in 2008, France announced a debt-fornature transaction with Madagascar, which will contribute US$20 million in
funding. This is the largest debt-for-nature exchange in Madagascar’s
history and has brought the Foundation’s total endowment to over US$50
million.133

B. Millennium Development Goals, the Paris Declaration
and Debt-for-Nature
The OECD argues that debt-for-nature exchanges should seek to
facilitate the achievement of water and environmental Millennium
Development Goals (“MDG”).134 The seventh MDG seeks to promote
“environmental stability” and takes a broad view of environmental
imperatives, including the integration of principles of sustainable
development into country policies and programs, the reduction of
biodiversity loss, the promotion of sustainable access to safe drinking water
and basic sanitation by 2015, and the achievement of significant
improvements in the lives of slum dwellers by 2020.135
These targets have been directly incorporated into more recent debtfor-nature agreements. For example, recent Italian exchanges use the MDGs
to provide a framework for debt-for-nature exchanges.136
In 2000, Italy enacted law 209/2000, a “Measure to reduce external debt
of lower-income and highly indebted countries.” This law enabled debt
swaps to be undertaken with countries with a commitment to human rights,
which have renounced war and evidenced a commitment to social and
human development. Under this law, funds liberated by a debt conversion
can be utilized in four specified sectors: agriculture, health, education, and
infrastructure.137 To date, the largest debt swap agreement that Italy has
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entered into was with Egypt in 2001. This debt-for-development agreement
was worth US$149 million and conducted over five years. The debt swap
focused on three areas: human development, poverty alleviation, and
environmental protection.
Two project clusters of the Italy-Egyptian Debt Swap Agreements
(“IEDS”) were in line with the seventh MDG. These were to increase access
to safe drinking water and to “integrate principles of sustainable
development” into national projects. Under these targets, dams were
constructed and pilot programs undertaken to facilitate treatment of
agricultural drainage using low cost technology. Research was also
undertaken into the establishment of desalination plants.138 In order to
foster principles of sustainable development, projects undertaken ranged
from environmentally sustainable tourism to measures to decrease
industrial pollution. These included the Dolphin Habitat Conservation
Project, relocation of tanneries to outside Cairo to contribute to cleaner
industrial production, and the training of neighborhood leaders in
environmental awareness.
Solid waste management and marine
biodiversity projects were also funded.139
Following the success of the IEDS, in 2006 Italy signed a debt-fordevelopment swap with Kenya for €44 million, focused on environmental
projects. Water and irrigation were priority sectors in light of the National
Water Services Strategy 2007-15, which aims to upgrade water systems in
rural areas.140 The upgrading of the Korogocho slum, another purpose of the
exchange, was also aligned with the MDGs and the National Slum Upgrading
Programme.
The debt-for-development exchanges undertaken by Italy, focused on
environmental projects, demonstrate how debt exchanges can be used
effectively and sustainably to address environmental challenges. They also
exhibit how environmental concerns can be viewed as part of broader
development concerns, and not as merely ancillary to poverty alleviation.
The second development in these debt-for-nature exchanges is the way
Italy has sought to implement the agreements under the dictates of the
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In 2005, the Paris Declaration
established five key principles for overseas development assistance:
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ownership, alignment, harmonization, results, and mutual accountability.141
The insistence on conditions by creditor nations, known as “conditionality,”
is no longer viewed as appropriate in an international aid program. Despite
the absence of conditions, the principles of the Paris Declaration have
provided a coherent framework by which debt-for-nature transactions can
promote, rather than undermine, good governance in debtor nations.
In a final report on the IEDS in 2008, the criteria against which the
implementation of programs was assessed were their alignment with the
MDGs and the principles of the Paris Declaration.142 The report concluded
that debt exchanges were able to conform to the two frameworks.143 In line
with the Paris Declaration, projects in the IEDS were mainly selected by the
Egyptian government in accordance with national priorities. The majority of
projects were implemented by Egyptian government entities, and both
nations were concurrently responsible for monitoring the implementation of
the agreement.144

C. Indonesia, Debt-for-Nature and the Clean Development
Mechanism
Although it was initially resistant to the idea of debt exchanges, since
2000 the government of Indonesia has expressed interest in participating in
exchanges with other nations. In a 1998 feasibility assessment, USAID
concluded that “[d]ebt-for-nature swaps are likely to be feasible in Indonesia
and should be actively pursued as a debt relief and conservation funding
mechanism.”145
Indonesia was seen as a prime candidate for debt-for-nature
exchanges, due to the ready availability of restructured debt and because
the rate of deforestation in Indonesia was alarmingly high.146 The East Asian
economic crisis had a substantial impact upon conservation funding in
Indonesia, with the budget for national parks management slashed by thirty
percent in 1998-99 in nominal terms (a 60 percent reduction in real terms).147
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Recognizing that the environment was ripe for debt-for-nature
exchanges, WWF, CI, TNC, and KEHATI (the Indonesian Biodiversity
Foundation) created a Joint Steering Committee to explore and coordinate
the possibilities for debt-for-nature exchanges and promote them to the
government.148 KEHATI organized a seminar on debt-for-nature swaps in
October 2004, where papers presented by the Indonesian Central Bank and
the National Planning Agency asserted that about US$800 million worth of
the country’s debt might be eligible for exchange.149
Following debt-for-education exchanges with Germany in 2002,
Germany and Indonesia entered into an innovative debt-for-nature exchange
in September 2006 under which €6.25 million has been invested to increase
environmental quality through targeted funding for small and micro
businesses.150 In 2009, Indonesia and the United States are expected to
finalize a US$19.6 million debt-for-nature agreement,151 and Indonesia is
currently in the final stages of negotiating a further €20 million debt-fornature exchange with Germany.152
While enthusiasm for debt-for-nature exchanges has not been uniform
within Indonesia,153 there has been continuing advocacy for a more
widespread use of the mechanism and greater dialogue with creditor
nations. Most recently, the Borneo Orangutan Survival Foundation (“BOS”)
has sought to implement a debt-for-nature exchange in conjunction with the
Clean Development Mechanism.
In 1997, the Indonesian government saved a 364,000-hectare area in
Central Kalimantan from becoming an oil palm plantation. The area is
home to an estimated 3,000 wild orangutans. The Indonesian government
had authorized the BOS to negotiate with the World Bank for the debt-fornature exchange to raise funds for ongoing protection of this area.154 The
founder of the BOS, Willie Smits, had envisioned that the area could be
offered to become a new permanent reserve, but under the condition that a
part of Indonesia’s debt be forgiven, with the area then managed not by the
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Indonesian government but by the BOS.155
The innovative nature of his project, however, was that Smits
conceived of the original conservation project being established under a
bilateral debt-for-nature agreement and the continued financing being
funded through the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), whereby
preservation of peat swamps could create a sustainable income through a
voluntary carbon offset program.156
There were some initial difficulties in such a project. For example,
Indonesia had, prior to 2004, not ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change157 and therefore was not
eligible to market carbon credits. To overcome this obstacle, Smits reached
an agreement with Shell Canada, which has a voluntary carbon credit
scheme.158 With ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the possibilities of this
scheme widened, with expressions of interest from the Netherlands and
Germany to participate in carbon trading for the purpose.159 This would be
the first such debt exchange to take place within the framework of the CDM.
While negotiations for this initiative appeared promising, no concrete
agreements have yet been signed.160
Progress has been slow with debt-for-nature exchanges in Indonesia,
despite a strong commitment by environmental NGOs to be involved in
innovative approaches. Smits has noted the difficulty in engaging creditor
support for debt exchanges, due to systemic corruption within Indonesia.161
The International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development has cited
disappointment with Indonesia’s most recent collaborative initiative on
international aid, the Jakarta Commitment, which has failed to articulate an
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two donor countries and multilateral institutions.162 The Commitment has,
however, failed to seek diplomatic debt reduction and debt relief. A greater
acceptance of debt restructuring and an increased commitment to wiping
out corruption may be required before debt-for-nature exchanges can begin
to fulfill their potential within Indonesia.

V. Conclusion
This article has charted the evolution of a relatively straightforward
mechanism, the debt-for-nature exchange.
Originally conceived and
implemented for relatively modest purposes, the mechanism has disproved
the doubts of those who suggested it was a financing technique with
relatively limited capacities that had passed its use-by date. Despite some
hiccups along the way, it seems that, much like standby letters of credit, the
debt exchange mechanism has a flexibility and simplicity that allows it to be
adapted for an increasing variety of purposes.
Indeed, as has been discussed, where there is sufficient political will
and interest, the mechanism can involve very significant amounts of money
and be used for historically groundbreaking purposes.
Yet, despite its advantages, the exchange mechanism is still
underutilized, particularly when compared to the extent of more traditional
funding of developing countries through development aid, and when
compared to the extent of straight debt cancelation. This may be due to a
number of factors: a misunderstanding of the purposes of the technique, an
overblown fear that the technique cannot accommodate the needs of
indigenous peoples, traditional notions of sovereignty, a failure in the past
to implement appropriate enforcement and governance structures, and a
shortage, particularly in developing countries, of the time, energy and
expertise needed to negotiate and properly implement debt exchanges.
A particularly shocking comparison is to compare the typical size of
debt-for-nature exchanges considered herein with the size of debt
cancelations afforded by the United States to promote its national security
interests, narrowly defined, and its geo-political interests. When the success
of Poland’s transition to democracy was seen as important for Eastern
Europe in the early 1990s, the United States cancelled $2.5 billion of its
debt.163 When Jordan’s moderating influence in the Middle East was seen to
matter, the United States cancelled $700 million of its debt.164 When Egypt’s
162.
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support of United States policy in the Middle East was particularly valued,
the United States cancelled $7 billion of its debt.165 And when the United
States was seeking to rebuild Iraq after the second Gulf war, the United
States cancelled $3.5 billion of its debt, for a nation with the world’s secondlargest oil reserves and thus the long-term capacity to repay the debt
readily.166
However, more recent developments are encouraging, and the
embryonic steps that have been taken to incorporate the debt exchange
process into the CDM regime under the Kyoto Protocol may represent a
further opportunity to promote environmental and developmental progress
through the use of a time-tested financing technique. Certainly these
exchanges are a tool that should be used far more often, and on a much
larger scale than have been the case to date as the world seeks to address
the ever more complex environmental and developmental challenges of the
twenty-first century.
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* * *
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